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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 
IN MULTINATIONAL LITIGATION* 
Tyler T. Ochoa** 
Abstract 
It is hornbook law that U.S. copyright law is not “extraterritorial,” i.e., that 
it does not apply to conduct occurring in other countries.  However, a 
distinction must be drawn between purely extraterritorial conduct, which is 
nonactionable, and conduct that crosses borders, so that at least a part of the 
offense takes place within the United States. Despite the nominal rule against 
extraterritoriality, U.S. courts have applied U.S. copyright law to a wide 
range of multi-territorial infringement claims.  Both importation and 
exportation of infringing copies or phonorecords are prohibited by statute, 
and the distribution right has been interpreted broadly to apply to a foreign 
seller who ships infringing goods into the United States.  Although mere 
“authorisation” in the United States that contributes to infringement 
occurring entirely in another country is not actionable, if there is a 
“predicate act” of infringement in the United States, courts are willing to 
award the defendant’s profits resulting from that infringement, even if those 
profits were earned overseas.  Acts in another country that contribute to 
infringement in the United States are actionable under U.S. law.  And finally, 
although courts are split over whether transmissions originating in the United 
States must be received here to be actionable, courts agree that transmissions 
originating in another country that are received in the United States are 
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actionable under U.S. law, at least where the defendant intentionally 
“targeted” those transmissions at the United States in some way.  Taken 
together, these doctrines afford copyright owners a wide range of options for 
applying U.S. copyright law to multi-territorial infringement claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
The international intellectual property system is based on the twin principles 
of territoriality and national treatment: each nation controls the protection and 
use of intellectual property within its own borders,1 and each nation promises 
to provide citizens and residents of other nations “treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the 
protection of intellectual property.”2 But international trade in intellectual 
property crosses borders with ease. Goods are produced in one country and 
distributed in another country. Broadcast transmissions are sent from one 
country and received in another country. Conduct in one country may 
contribute to distribution of goods in another country. The Internet adds an 
additional dimension to the problem: copies may be uploaded from one 
 
 
1 See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, as amended 
on Sept. 28, 1979 (hereinafter the Berne Convention), art. 5(2) (“the extent of protection, as 
well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed 
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.”), available at 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/283698 (last visited June 1, 2020). Cf. American Code Co. 
v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1922) (“The copyright laws of one country have no 
extraterritorial operation, unless otherwise provided.”). 
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter the TRIPS 
Agreement), art. 3(1). The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
The current text, as amended on 23 January 2017, is available at https://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_01_e.htm (last visited June 1, 2020). 
See also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as amended on Sept. 28, 
1979 (hereinafter the Paris Convention), art. 2(1) (“Nationals of any country of the Union 
shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the 
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to [their] 
nationals.”), available at https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/288514 (last visited June 1, 2020); 
Berne Convention, art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are 
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, 
the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.”). 





country at the direction of someone in another country, stored on a server in 
a third country, and transmitted to a fourth country.  When such conduct 
occurs without the consent of the right holder, which country’s laws apply to 
the conduct? 
This article will examine the United States’ approach to the choice of law 
problem in one area of intellectual property law: copyright.  After a brief 
background section, the article will explore the application of U.S. law to four 
categories of cases.  First, cases involving importation and exportation of 
physical goods will be examined.  Second, cases involving an alleged 
domestic contribution to foreign infringement will be analysed. Third, cases 
involving an alleged foreign contribution to domestic infringement will be 
considered. Fourth, cases involving broadcast and internet transmissions 
across borders will be analysed. Together, these four categories of cases 
demonstrate that U.S. courts typically are willing to apply U.S. law to cases 
having even a minimal connection with the United States, with little 
consideration, if any, to the interests that other nations may have in applying 
their own law to the dispute. 
BACKGROUND 
One potential solution to the choice-of-law problem in “multi-territorial 
infringement” cases is harmonisation of substantive copyright law.3 If two 
nations’ copyright laws are identical, then in theory it does not matter which 
nation applies its law to the dispute. (Of course, there must still be some sort 
of mechanism for determining the choice of forum and avoiding conflicting 
 
 
3 This is the approach that has increasingly been taken in the European Union, where a series 
of directives have reduced (but not eliminated) the disparities between the national copyright 
laws of its 27 member states. See generally IRINI STAMATOUDI & PAUL TORREMANS, EU 
COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY (Elgar 2d ed. 2021) 
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decisions.4) In the absence of such harmonisation, however, general 
principles of tort law suggest that one should apply either the law of the place 
where the wrongful act or omission occurs,5 or the law of the place where the 
damage or harm occurs.6 
Of course, determining where an act, omission, damage, or harm “occurs” for 
an infringement of intangible property is such a difficult problem that the 
most recent international agreement on choice of forum omitted intellectual 
property altogether.7 One could argue, for example, that the “harm” or 
“damage” always manifests itself in the country of the copyright owner’s 
domicile, regardless of where the infringement took place. But the twin 
principles of territoriality and national treatment suggest instead that 
intellectual property should be governed by the law of the country in which 
protection is claimed, that is, the country in which the alleged infringement 
has taken place.8 Determining where an infringement occurred, in turn, 
depends on the substantive law involved and the exclusive right that allegedly 
has been violated. 
 
 
4 In the European Union, for example, see EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) [hereinafter EU Regulation 1215/2012]. 
5 See, e.g., Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [hereinafter Hague Convention on Recognition 
of Judgments], art. 5(1)(j) (for “a non-contractual obligation arising from … damage to or 
loss of tangible property,” recognizing judgments where “the act or omission directly causing 
such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of where that harm occurred”) 
(emphasis added). 
6 See, e.g., EC Regulation 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations [hereinafter Rome II Regulation], art. 4(1) (“the law applicable to a 
non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which 
the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred”). 
7 See Hague Convention on Recognition of Judgments, art. 1(m) (“This Convention shall not 
apply to … intellectual property”). 
8 This is the approach taken in the European Union. See Rome II Regulation, art. 8(1) (“The 
law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual 
property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed.”). 





In the United States, copyright law is governed by a federal statute: the 
Copyright Act of 1976, as amended.9 Section 106 of the Copyright Act 
provides copyright owners with five exclusive rights: (1) reproduction, (2) 
adaptation, (3) public distribution, (4) public performance, and (5) public 
display.10 Exceptions and limitations to those rights are provided in Sections 
107 through 122.11 Infringement is defined as the unauthorised exercise of 
any of those five rights.12 
Unlike the U.S. Patent Act,13 the U.S. Copyright Act does not expressly limit 
its applicability to the territory of the United States. Nonetheless, the Courts 
of Appeals have uniformly held that “the United States copyright laws do not 
reach acts of infringement that take place entirely abroad.”14 Thus, for 
example, a claim that the State Bank of India infringed the plaintiff’s software 
 
 
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. 
10 17 U.S.C. § 106. A sixth exclusive right provides copyright owners of sound recordings 
with the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital 
audio transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). Sound recordings (along architectural works and 
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works) are not afforded a general right of public 
performance. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (listing the categories of works to which the public 
performance right applies). 
11 Most of the exceptions and limitations are narrow and specific, applying only to specified 
types of works and/or to specified exclusive rights. Two exceptions and limitations are of 
general applicability: the fair use doctrine, which provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted 
work … is not an infringement of copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 107; and the first-sale doctrine, 
also known as the doctrine of exhaustion, under which the owner of a particular copy may 
resell or redistribute that copy without the authorization of the copyright owner, 17 U.S.C. § 
109(a). 
12 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 … is an infringer of the copyright”). 
13 See 35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1) (granting “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the 
invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, … the right to exclude 
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into 
the United States, products made by that process”). 
14 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathé Comms. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994); accord, 
Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Lights Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
See also Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (“it is only where an 
infringing act occurs in the United States that the infringement is actionable under the federal 
Copyright Act”); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 
1976) (“Copyright laws do not have extraterritorial application.”). 
 
94  Indian J. Intell. Prop. L. 
by distributing it and using it at its branches in India had to be dismissed.15 
However, “a distinction should be drawn between purely extraterritorial 
conduct, which is itself nonactionable, and conduct that crosses borders, so 
that at least a part of the offense takes place within the United States.”16 With 
one exception, courts are left to work out whether the statute applies with 
respect to such “multi-territorial infringement claims”17 on a case-by-case 
basis.18 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. CASE LAW 
I. Importing and Exporting Infringing Goods 
With regard to physical goods, the principles outlined above suggest that a 
court should apply both the law of the country where the reproduction takes 
place (to determine whether the reproduction was lawful), and the law of the 
country where the distribution of copies takes place (to determine whether the 
distribution was lawful). However, considering economic harm occurs only 
when the goods are sold, as a practical matter, it may be expected that the 
country into which the goods are imported will apply its own law. This is 
especially true if the country has adopted a rule of domestic exhaustion, under 
 
 
15 See Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. State Bank of India, 177 F. Supp. 2d 881, 886-87 
(N.D. Ind. 2001). The infringement claim was allowed to proceed, however, with respect to 
unauthorized use of the software at the Bank’s branch in New York. Id. at 887 n.2. 
16 Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1371, quoting 4 RAYMOND B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 17.02 (2008) (hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT). 
17 Id. 
18 Whether the statute encompasses such cross-border conduct is an element of the cause of 
action and is properly raised on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or on a motion 
for summary judgment, rather than on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1366-68; Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2017). In Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d at 1258, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the territorial limit was jurisdictional; but the Federal Circuit 
in Litecubes disagreed on the basis of intervening authority of the U.S. Supreme Court. 523 
F.3d at 1368. 





which the intellectual property owner may prohibit even lawfully made goods 
from being imported and distributed without its authorisation.19 
In the United States, the one statutory provision governing multi-territorial 
infringement claims (conduct crossing borders) involves importation and 
exportation. Section 602(a)(1) provides: 
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the 
owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords 
of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is 
an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or 
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 
501.20 
And section 602(a)(2), added in 2008,21 provides: 
Importation into the United States or exportation from 
the United States, without the authority of the owner 
of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords, 
the making of which either constituted an infringement 
of copyright, or which would have constituted an 
infringement of copyright if this title had been 
applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive right to 
 
 
19 The issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights proved so contentious that the TRIPS 
Agreement left countries free to adopt any rule of exhaustion they wish, subject only to the 
non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favored nation status. See 
TRIPS Agreement, art. 6 (“subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this 
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights.”). 
20 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1). This language was enacted in 1976 as subsection 602(a), and was 
renumbered as subsection 602(a)(1) in 2008. 
21 See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 
(hereinafter “PRO-IP Act”), Pub. L. 110-403, Tit. I, § 105(b), 122 Stat. 4259. 
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distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, 
actionable under sections 501 and 506.22 
Together, these two sections could be read to suggest that importing or 
exporting infringing copies violates section 602(a)(2), and is subject to both 
civil and criminal penalties, while importing otherwise lawful copies or 
phonorecords violates only section 602(a)(1), and is subject only to civil 
penalties.23 Both sections, however, make unauthorised importation and 
exportation “an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or 
phonorecords under section 106.”24 And section 106 itself expressly says that 
its exclusive rights are “subject to [the exceptions and limitations in] sections 
107 through 122.”25 One of those limitations is the first-sale doctrine, or the 
doctrine of exhaustion, which expressly allows “the owner the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title … to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord” without the 
authorisation of the copyright owner, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of 
section 106(3).”26 Accordingly, in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza 
Research International, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that 
former section 602(a) (now section 602(a)(1)) is subject to the first-sale 
doctrine.27 And 15 years later, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the 
Court clarified that “the ‘first sale’ doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted 
 
 
22 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2). Section 501 stipulates a civil penalty while section 506 is a criminal 
penalty. 
23 “Copies” are defined as “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is 
fixed,” while “phonorecords” are defined as “material objects in which sounds, other than 
those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
Note that exporting lawfully-made copies or phonorecords does not violate the statute at all. 
24 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1), (a)(2). 
25 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
26 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
27 Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 144 (1998). 
In so holding, the Court held that the phrase “to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession” 
of a copy “includes the right to ship it to another person in another country.” 523 U.S. at 152. 





work lawfully made abroad,”28 interpreting the phrase “lawfully made under 
this title” to mean “‘in accordance with’ or ‘in compliance with’ the 
Copyright Act” rather than “lawfully made in the United States.”29 Thus, 
subsection 602(a)(1) is largely redundant; it only prohibits importation of 
infringing copies and phonorecords (which is also prohibited by subsection 
(a)(2)) and importation of lawful copies and phonorecords by those who have 
such copies or phonorecords in their possession without obtaining ownership 
of them.30 
Moreover, some courts have interpreted subsection 106(3), which grants the 
copyright owner the exclusive right to public distribution, in a way that 
renders the importation prohibition in subsection 602(a)(2) somewhat 
redundant. In Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., for example, 
the court considered a Canadian company, doing business as 
GlowProducts.com, which “sold the accused products directly to customers 
located in the United States and … would ship the products, f.o.b., from its 
Canadian offices to its customers in the United States.”31 “‘F.o.b’ or ‘free on 
 
 
28 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013). Kirtsaeng involved a 
graduate student from Thailand, studying in the United States, who asked friends and family 
in Thailand to purchase copies of textbooks printed in Asia by the U.S. copyright owner and 
to ship them to him in the United States, where he re-sold them at a substantial profit. Id. at 
526-27. 
29 Id. at 530. As a result, the Court subsequently vacated a previous opinion in which the 
“Defendants purchased Foreign Editions of Plaintiffs’ books in India and resold them in the 
United States,” because that case had held “the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies of 
a copyrighted work manufactured abroad” in India. Pearson Education, Inc. v. Kumar, 721 
F. Supp. 2d 166, 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Pearson Education, Inc. v. Yadav, 
452 Fed. Appx. 11 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom. Kumar v. 
Pearson Education, Inc., 568 U.S. 1247 (2013), judgment vacated, 523 Fed. Appx. 13 (2d 
Cir. 2013).  
30 Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 534-35, 547; see also id. at 554-55 (Kagan, J., joined by Alito, J., 
concurring); id. at 565-67 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Kennedy and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). 
31 Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
One of the defendant’s products in Litecubes was alleged to infringe both a U.S. patent and 
a U.S. copyright registered to the plaintiff. The defendant did not contest the jury’s finding 
that the product infringed both. Id. The other product was alleged to infringe only the U.S. 
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board’ is ‘a method of shipment whereby goods are delivered at a designated 
location, usually a transportation depot, at which legal title and thus the risk 
of loss passes from seller to buyer.”32 In other words, GlowProducts 
contended that it sold the infringing products in Canada, and that the buyers 
located in the United States were the ones who “imported” the infringing 
products into the United States, even though GlowProducts packaged the 
goods, addressed the packages to buyers in the United States, and delivered 
the packages to the post office or shipping company in Canada.33 Not 
surprisingly, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument, holding that a “sale” 
of the infringing items occurred in the United States when the items were 
shipped directly to consumers in the United States, regardless of where title 
was transferred as a formal matter.34 Although the court did not rely on the 
fact that section 602 expressly makes importation (and exportation) a 
violation of the distribution right,35 the ruling is consistent with the statute, 
and with the holding in Quality King that the statutory phrase “to sell or 
 
 
patent, and the jury’s determination that the product was infringing was upheld. Id. at 1372-
74. 
32 Id. at 1358 n.1, quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 
420 F.3d 1369, 1374 n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
33 Alternatively, since patent and copyright are both strict liability statutes, GlowProducts 
could have contended that the post office or shipping company was the person “importing” 
the allegedly infringing products into the United States. 
34 Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1369-71 (patent); id. at 1371-72 (copyright). See also Liberty Toy 
Co. v. Fred Silber Co., 149 F.3d 1183, 1998 WL 385469 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished disposi-
tion) (complaint alleged that defendant Maple Leaf Toy Co., based in Canada, committed 
direct infringement in the United States when it sold allegedly infringing goods and shipped 
them to U.S. buyer in Michigan; contract provided that seller retained title until payment was 
made). 
35 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (unauthorized importation “is an infringement of the exclusive right 
to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106”); 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (unauthorized 
importation or exportation of infringing copies “is an infringement of the exclusive right to 
distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106”). 





otherwise dispose of the possession” of a lawfully made copy “includes the 
right to ship it to another person in another country.”36 
The importation right also has been applied against a U.S. defendant who 
ordered (and paid for) allegedly infringing copies made outside the United 
States, on the grounds that the defendant caused the infringing copies to be 
imported. In Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co.,37 
the parties were competitors in the business of providing seismic data to the 
petroleum industry. Under Canadian law, the plaintiff was required to submit 
copies of its seismic data maps to the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board, a government agency, which was required to keep 
them confidential for a period of ten years. After the ten-year period expired, 
defendant TGS ordered a copy of the maps from the Board, which made 
copies and mailed them to TGS in Houston, at the defendant’s expense.38 
When Geophysical sued TGS for infringement, TGS defended on the ground 
that the copies were made outside the United States, and that the “act of state” 
doctrine prohibits a United States court from reviewing the validity of the 
actions of a foreign government.39 
The Court of Appeals held that the “act of state” doctrine did not prohibit the 
importation claim against TGS from going forward, because it did not require 
 
 
36 Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998). 
See also Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) (defendant “sold at least 25 
copies of [the infringing work] to residents of the United States, and shipped these copies 
from France to the United States.”); id. at 1258 (“the importation of the infringing work is an 
infringing act occurring in the United States.”). 
37 850 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2017). 
38 Id. at 789. 
39 Id. at 790. Cf. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (declining to 
exercise jurisdiction over claims for infringement of foreign patents, even if related to the 
U.S. patents at issue; “assuming arguendo that the act of state doctrine applies, the doctrine 
would prevent our courts from inquiring into the validity of a foreign patent grant and require 
our courts to adjudicate [foreign] patent claims regardless of validity or enforceability.”). 
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the court to determine whether the Board acted illegally or invalidly, or was 
an infringer: “even a ruling in favor of Geophysical will not invalidate any 
action by the Canadian government, but only determine the effect of such 
action on the right of United States citizens to import copies that a Canadian 
agency made.”40 It further held that “[t]he inapplicability of the United States 
Copyright Act to extraterritorial conduct provides no defense to 
Geophysical’s importation claim.”41 It explained: 
It is undisputed that TGS imported the copies of Geophysical’s 
seismic lines into Houston, Texas by causing the CNLOP 
Board to send them there. Therefore, the act of importation 
occurred in the United States and is actionable under the 
Copyright Act depending on the resolution of TGS’s first sale 
defense.42 
Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether copies had been “lawfully made under this title” for purposes of 
applying the first-sale doctrine.43 In a later appeal, the court upheld a finding 
that Geophysical had granted the Board an implied license to reproduce and 
 
 
40 850 F.3d at 797. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 797-98. 
43 Id. at 798. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Court suggested in dicta that 
whether the copies were “lawfully made” for purposes of applying the first-sale doctrine 
should be determined according to the standards of U.S. law, rather than according to the law 
of the place where the copies were made. 568 U.S. 519, 529-30 (2013). Nonetheless, the Fifth 
Circuit declined to resolve the issue, instructing the district court to determine in the first 
instance whether Canadian law or U.S. law applied to the reproduction. 850 F.3d at 795-96 
& 798. On remand, the district court concluded that “a copy is lawful if it was made in the 
United States in compliance with Title 17 or in a foreign country in a manner that would 
comply with Title 17 if United States copyright law applied.” Geophysical Service, Inc. v. 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 125 U.S.P.Q.2d 1118, 1120 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2017). 





distribute the seismic maps, and it therefore affirmed the dismissal of the 
action.44 
The plaintiff in Geophysical also alleged that TGS was a contributory 
infringer, because it induced or encouraged the Board to reproduce the works 
in Canada and export them to the United States.45 The court rejected this 
claim, holding that the reproduction and the exportation took place entirely 
in Canada.46 This is inconsistent with Litecubes, which held that the Canadian 
seller violated the “importation” right when it shipped infringing goods into 
the United States, regardless of where title passes.47 It is also inconsistent with 
statutory language indicating that it is the seller, rather than the buyer, who 
violates the distribution right.48 This distinction is supported by case law 
indicating that infringing goods cannot be seized from an innocent purchaser 
who was not itself an infringer.49 Thus, Geophysical should have been 
analysed as a case of contributory infringement, in which an American buyer 
knowingly contributed to the infringing act of a foreign seller. As the Fifth 
Circuit recognised, however, adjudicating the claim for contributory 
infringement would have run afoul of the act of state doctrine, as it would 
 
 
44 Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 784 Fed. Appx. 253 (5th Cir. 
2019). 
45 Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 799-800 (5th 
Cir. 2017). 
46 Id. at 800 (“The act of ‘exportation’ occurred entirely in Canada, and is beyond the reach 
of the Copyright Act notwithstanding the destination.”). 
47 Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
48 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (granting the exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of 
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, 
or lending”) (emphasis added). Recall that importation “is an infringement of the exclusive 
right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106.” 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) 
(emphasis added). 
49 Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Beseder, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1107 (D. 
Ariz. 2006) (“Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Lindquist infringed any copyrights by 
purchasing or possessing” the infringing sculpture); id. at 1112 (the Copyright Act “does not 
permit the impoundment of infringing items in the hands of innocent purchasers who are not 
themselves liable for infringement.”). Of course, a buyer who subsequently resells or 
otherwise redistributes an infringing copy becomes an infringer. 
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have required the court to determine whether the Canadian government 
agency was a direct infringer.50 But in seeking to avoid the act of state 
doctrine, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly held that it was the U.S. buyer of 
infringing copies, and not the foreign seller, who violated the importation 
right. 
II. Foreign Contribution to Domestic Infringement 
We next consider other conduct occurring outside the United States that 
contributes to infringement occurring inside the United States. When the 
direct infringement occurs in the United States, U.S. courts are willing to hold 
foreign actors liable for contributing to that infringement, provided that the 
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States and the usual 
elements of contributory infringement are satisfied.51 As stated by one court: 
[A] defendant can be liable for contributory infringement, 
even for acts committed outside the United States, by inducing 
or contributing to another’s infringement occurring in the 
United States by supplying such other person with the 
instruments for committing the infringement, provided the 
defendant knew or should have known that the other would or 
could reasonably be expected to commit the infringement.52 
 
 
50 Cf. Geophysical, 850 F.3d at 797 (“Evaluating the first sale defense in connection with 
TGS’s importation of copies made by the Board does not decide whether the CNLOP Board 
is a copyright infringer, which would be a prohibited inquiry.”) (emphasis in original). 
51 Contributory infringement generally requires three elements: 1) direct infringement; 2) 
defendant must have knowledge of the direct infringement; and 3) defendant induced, caused 
or materially contributed to the infringing conduct. PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §21:46. 
52 Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 454, 462 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding Canadian company liable for ordering infringing products and 
having them shipped to sister company in the United States, which sold the infringing 
products here). See also Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635-36 
 





This is consistent with the rule in patent law: although contributory 
infringement in patent law expressly requires conduct in the United States,53 
active inducement does not,54 and courts have allowed claims based on 
overseas conduct that induced infringement in the United States.55 In patent 
law, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that liability for active inducement 
requires either actual knowledge of the infringement or wilful blindness; mere 
negligence (or even recklessness) is not sufficient.56 This standard has been 
 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (use in UK of allegedly infringing sample in a recording later distributed by 
others in the United States); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Calif. Authority of Racing Fairs, 785 
F. Supp. 854, 864 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (“it is possible for a defendant to commit acts outside the 
United States sufficient to find it contributorily or vicariously liable for acts of infringement 
committed by others within the United States”) (dicta), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993); GB Marketing USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen 
GmbH & Co., 782 F. Supp. 763, 772-73 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (reproduction and sale of bottles 
with allegedly infringing labels in Germany, with knowledge that bottles would be exported 
to the United States and sold there). 
53 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports 
into the United States a component of a patented [invention], or a material or apparatus for 
use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, 
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing 
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”) (emphasis added). 
54 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer.”). 
55 Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., 909 F.3d 398, 408 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“Unlike direct infringement … , which must occur in the United States, liability for 
induced infringement under § 271(b) can be imposed based on extraterritorial acts, provided 
that the patentee proves the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge and specific intent 
to induce direct infringement in the United States.”); Merial, Ltd. v. Cipla, Ltd., 681 F.3d 
1283, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“where a foreign party, with the requisite knowledge and 
intent, employs extraterritorial means to actively induce acts of direct infringement that occur 
within the United States, such conduct is [actionable] under § 271(b).”); DSU Medical Corp. 
v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (approving jury instruction); 
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1975) (“‘active 
inducement’ may be found in events outside the United States if they result in a direct 
infringement here.”). 
56 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 759-60 (2011) (defendant 
“argues that active inducement liability under § 271(b) requires more than deliberate 
indifference to a known risk … [and that] actual knowledge of the patent is needed.”); id. at 
766 (“We agree that deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists is not the 
appropriate standard,” but approving willful blindness); id. at 769 (“A court can properly find 
willful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew. By 
contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk 
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adopted for contributory infringement in copyright law.57 Hence, the quote in 
the indented paragraph above should be modified to remove the “or should 
have known” language. 
Because the doctrine of contributory infringement requires knowledge of the 
infringing activity (including, one presumes, the location of the infringing 
activity), it is fair to hold a foreign actor that knowingly contributes to a direct 
infringement in the United States to the standards of U.S. copyright law. 
III. Domestic Contribution to Foreign Infringement 
The converse situation involves conduct occurring within the United States 
that contributes to infringement occurring outside the United States. If a 
domestic actor knowingly contributes to a direct infringement in a foreign 
country, it is fair to hold that domestic actor to the standards of foreign 
copyright law. Many U.S. courts, however, have tended to go only halfway, 
dismissing the claim under U.S. law without considering whether the claim 
should be heard under foreign law. In response, other U.S. courts have 
overcorrected by applying U.S. law whenever there is a “predicate act” of 
infringement in the United States, even when the claim should be analysed 
under foreign law. The result is that U.S. courts tend to apply U.S. law to the 
entire dispute or not at all, instead of considering the middle ground of 




of such wrongdoing, and a negligent defendant is one who should have known of a similar 
risk but, in fact, did not.”). 
57 See, e.g., BMG Rights Mgmt. (US), LLC v. Cox Comms., Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 308-10 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (requiring actual knowledge or willful blindness; “negligence is insufficient”); see 
also Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(requiring actual knowledge or willful blindness, without discussing the issue); cf. Erickson 
Prods., Inc. v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2017) (“even if the ‘should have known’ 
instruction was erroneous,” defendant “did not raise this objection at trial”). 





The leading case in the United States is Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathé 
Communications Co.58 Subafilms produced the movie Yellow Submarine, 
which was released in 1968 by MGM. Two decades later, MGM released the 
movie on home video in the United States, and it licensed Warner Brothers to 
release the movie on home video outside the United States. Subafilms sued 
both MGM and Warner for infringement, and a special master found that their 
use was unauthorised, because the 1967 licensing agreement between 
Subafilms and MGM did not include home video distribution. The district 
court awarded 2.2 million in compensatory damages, half for the domestic 
distribution and half for the international distribution.59 
The defendants appealed the award for international distribution on the 
ground that U.S. copyright law did not extend to foreign sales. With regard to 
the foreign sales, the only conduct that had occurred in the United States was 
execution of the licensing agreement that “authorised” Warner to distribute 
the film on home video outside the United States.60 However, section 106 
grants to copyright owners “the exclusive rights to do and to authorise any of 
the following” acts, including reproduction and distribution to the public.61 
Based on this language, a previous case had held that domestic authorisation 
of foreign infringing activity was itself an actionable infringement under 
United States law.62 After a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on the 
 
 
58 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
59 Id. at 1089. 
60 Id. at 1089 & n.3. 
61 17 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added). 
62 Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
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earlier case, the full court granted rehearing en banc to reconsider its previous 
holding.63 
The en banc court held that domestic authorisation of foreign activity was not 
sufficient to constitute either direct or contributory infringement under United 
States law.64 It reasoned as follows: first, “the addition of the words ‘to 
authorise’ in the [1976] Copyright Act was not meant to create a new form of 
liability for ‘authorisation’ … but was intended [only] to invoke the pre-
existing doctrine of contributory infringement.”65 Second, there can be no 
liability for contributory infringement without proof of direct infringement.66 
Third,  
Given the undisputed axiom that United States copyright law 
has no extraterritorial application, it would seem to follow 
necessarily that a primary activity outside the boundaries of 
the United States, not constituting an infringement cognisable 
under the Copyright Act, cannot serve as the basis for holding 
 
 
63 In the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals, appeals are normally decided by panels of 
three judges. When a court grants rehearing en banc, all of the non-recused active judges on 
that court decide the case, except in the Ninth Circuit. Because the Ninth Circuit is so large 
(28 active judges), in the Ninth Circuit a case in which rehearing en banc is granted is decided 
by a panel of 11 judges (the Chief Judge, plus ten that are randomly selected). See 9th Cir. 
R. 35-3. 
64 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathé Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(“we conclude that there can be no liability under the United States copyright laws for 
authorizing an act that itself could not constitute infringement of rights secured by those laws, 
and that wholly extraterritorial acts of infringement are not cognizable under the Copyright 
Act.”) (emphasis in original). 
65 Id. at 1092. In so holding, the court relied on a statement in the legislative history that 
explained: “Use of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions as to the 
liability of contributory infringers.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674. 
66 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1092-93. Accord, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 
F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004); DSC Comms. Corp. v. Pulse Comms. Corp., 170 F.3d 1354, 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 





liable under the Copyright Act one who is merely related to 
that activity within the United States.67 
Accordingly, the court concluded that “the mere authorisation of acts of 
infringement that are not cognizable under the United States copyright laws 
because they occur entirely outside of the United States does not state a claim 
for infringement under the Copyright Act.”68 
Two district courts in other circuits have expressly disagreed with Subafilms 
on this point.69 In Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., for example, producer Curb, 
who held the rights to reproduce and distribute certain sound recordings in 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, authorised the 
distribution of those recordings in several other countries.70 The court rejected 
Subafilms and held that “authorising the distribution of the recordings for sale 
to a worldwide public” violated U.S. law.71 It explained: 
[P]iracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today, 
the raider need not grab the bounty with his own hands; 
he need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax 
to start the presses in a distant land. Subafilms ignores 
this economic reality, … and transforms infringement 
of the authorisation right into a requirement of 
domestic presence by a primary infringer. Under this 
view, a phone call to Nebraska results in liability; the 
 
 
67 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093, quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04 (1993). 
68 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1099. 
69 See Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Expediters 
Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., 995 F. Supp. 468, 476-77 (D.N.J. 
1998). 
70 Curb, 898 F. Supp. at 592 (listing Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, and 
South Africa), id. at 594 (listing Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). 
71 Id. at 596. 
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same phone call to France results in riches. In a global 
marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a 
difference.72 
Despite these dissenting voices, however, Subafilms’ holding that domestic 
authorisation of extraterritorial conduct does not violate U.S. law is widely 
accepted.73 The unstated implication is that the claim of domestic contribution 
to infringement occurring in another country should be heard in the country 
where the direct infringement occurred, under that country’s laws.74 
By contrast, however, there are a number of cases that distinguish Subafilms 
and apply U.S. law to foreign infringements under the so-called “predicate 
act” doctrine. 
The predicate act doctrine originated in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp.75 Defendants were found to have infringed the plaintiffs’ play 
Dishonored Lady in making and exhibiting the motion picture Letty Lynton.76 
 
 
72 Id. at 595. 
73 See, e.g., Geophysical Service, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 799 
(5th Cir. 2017) (“In short, we follow the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms. Where a 
copyright plaintiff claims contributory infringement predicated on direct infringement that 
occurred entirely extraterritorially, the plaintiff has stated no claim.”); Datacarrier, S.A .v. 
WOCCU Servs. Group, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1084 (W.D. Wisc. 2016) (“This court 
will follow Subafilms, like the majority of courts to consider the issue.”); Rundquist v. 
Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 128-29 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Notwithstanding the criticism of 
the results, the Subafilms ruling remains the majority rule”); Armstrong v. Virgin Records, 
Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Subafilms “is now generally accepted”); 2 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 25:87 (2019) (approving Subafilms and 
rejecting Curb). 
74 Because there is no claim under U.S. law, few courts have considered whether a claim for 
foreign infringement could be heard in a U.S. court against a defendant domiciled in the 
United States, while still applying foreign law. 
75 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied in relevant part, 308 U.S. 617 (1939), cert. granted 
on other grounds, 308 U.S. 545 (1939), and affirmed, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
76 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 
669 (1936). 





Defendants objected to inclusion of “the profits made from exhibiting the 
infringing picture outside the United States.”77 The court responded: 
At first blush it would indeed seem that these should be 
excluded. […] However, exhibition is not the only act 
forbidden by the [1909] Copyright Act; Section 1(d) gives to 
the author the exclusive right, not only to perform a dramatic 
work, but “to make … any transcription or record thereof … 
from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner … be 
… reproduced.” [Defendants] made the negatives in this 
country, or had them made here, and shipped them abroad, 
where the positives were produced and exhibited. The 
negatives were “records” from which the work could be 
“reproduced”, and it was a tort to make them in this country. 
The plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest in them as soon as 
they were made, which attached to any profits from their 
exploitation, whether in the form of money remitted to the 
United States, or of increase in the value of shares of foreign 
companies held by the defendants. […] [A]s soon as any of the 
profits so realized took the form of property whose situs was 
in the United States, our law seized upon them and impressed 
them with a constructive trust, whatever their form.78 
In Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, however, the court rejected a 
claim of profits from public performances in Canada of songs from the 
musical Jesus Christ Superstar, even though “the defendants assembled and 
 
 
77 106 F.2d at 52. 
78 Id. (bracketed insertions and ellipses added). See also Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco 
Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (infringing recordings made in 
United States were shipped abroad and used to make phonograph records in other countries). 
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arranged in the United States all the necessary elements for the performances 
in Canada, and then simply travelled to Canada to complete the 
performances.”79 The court explained that, unlike in Sheldon, the Canadian 
performances were not enabled by any act of infringement in the United 
States.80 “It is only when the type of infringement permits further 
reproduction abroad that its exploitation abroad becomes the subject of a 
constructive trust.”81 
Although Sheldon and Stigwood were both based on the language of the 1909 
Copyright Act, courts applying the 1976 Act adopted the same reasoning. 
Thus, in Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., a copyrighted poster was 
reproduced in an Israeli newspaper, which also distributed some copies in the 
United States.82 Based on Stigwood, the court held that liability depended on 
whether a “predicate act” of infringement had occurred in the United States: 
As the applicability of American copyright laws over the 
Israeli newspapers depends on the occurrence of a predicate 
act in the United States, the geographic location of the illegal 
reproduction is crucial. If the illegal reproduction of the poster 
occurred in the United States and then was exported to Israel, 
the magistrate properly could include damages accruing from 
the Israeli newspapers. If, as appellants assert, this predicate 
 
 
79 530 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1976). Presumably, the “arrangements” referred to as 
occurring in the U.S. included casting, rehearsals, and contracts for the performances in 
Canada. 
80 Id. at 1101 (“The steps taken by the defendants preliminary to the Canadian performances 
were certainly not the ‘manufacture’ of anything, nor were the performances ‘records’ from 
which the work could be ‘reproduced.’”). 
81 530 F.2d at 1101. 
82 843 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994). 





act occurred in Israel, American copyright laws would have no 
application to the Israeli newspapers.83 
Although the defendants contended that the initial copying (photographing a 
copy of the poster seen “on an office wall”) had occurred in Israel, they failed 
to submit any admissible evidence to support the claim.84 Based in part on the 
defendants’ dilatory and evasive responses to discovery, the court concluded 
instead that this “predicate act” had occurred in the United States.85 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the “predicate act” of infringement doctrine, 
with a twist. In Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd.,86 
news footage recorded by LANS was broadcast, with authorisation, on the 
Today show on NBC. Pursuant to preexisting contracts, the Today show was 
transmitted to both Visnews and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in 
New York, each of which made a copy on videotape. Visnews (a joint venture 
between NBC, Reuters, and the BBC) transmitted its videotaped copy to its 
subscribers in Europe and Africa; while EBU transmitted its videotaped copy 
to Reuters in London, which in turn re-transmitted the program to its 
subscribers.87 Summarising Sheldon and Update Art, the court remarked that 
“[r]ecovery of damages arising from overseas infringing uses was allowed 
because the predicate act of infringement occurring within the United States 
enabled further reproduction abroad.”88 The plaintiff sought to apply this rule: 
 
 
83 Id. at 73. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. It is sometimes asserted that the court found that the Israeli newspapers themselves 
were reproduced in the United States. A careful reading of the opinion reveals that this is not 
the case; instead, the “predicate act” was only the initial reproduction of the poster by 
defendants. 
86 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998). 
87 Id. at 990. 
88 Id. at 992. 
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While the extraterritorial damages resulted from Reuters’s 
overseas dissemination of the works received by satellite 
transmissions from Visnews and EBU, those transmissions 
were made possible by the infringing acts of copying in New 
York. The satellite transmissions, thus, were merely a means 
of shipping the unlicensed footage abroad for further 
dissemination.89 
The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that “LANS is entitled to recover damages 
flowing from exploitation abroad of the domestic acts of infringement 
committed by defendants.”90 
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, holding that LANS could only recover any profits the defendants 
had made from the infringement, rather than its actual damages (i.e., lost 
licensing fees for overseas use); and that LANS had failed to prove that 
Reuters and Visnews had earned any profits from the infringement, 
presumably because they earned the same amount of money from their 
subscribers regardless of whether the Today show contained infringing 
content or not.91 On appeal, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It 
first noted that both Sheldon and Update Art concerned an award of 
defendants’ profits, not actual damages.92 It then reasoned that Subafilms 
“counsel[s] a narrow application … of the Sheldon exception to the general 





91 Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 340 F.3d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
92 Id. at 929-30. “As Sheldon considered only an award of profits, it is counterintuitive that a 
court applying Sheldon’s rationale, but using the word ‘damages’ as the Reuters III court did, 
was referring consciously to ‘actual damages’ as opposed to ‘profits.’” Id. at 929. 





al connection that preserves consistency with Congress’s decision to keep the 
copyright laws … territorially confined.”93 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the “predicate act” doctrine is limited to a recovery of foreign profits enabled 
by a domestic act of infringement, and that it does not allow the recovery of 
extraterritorial damages more generally.94 
The Fourth Circuit has also adopted the “predicate act” doctrine, but in doing 
so it extended the doctrine far beyond what the Second and Ninth Circuits had 
approved. In Tire Engineering & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong 
Rubber Co., defendants copied the plaintiff’s blueprints for mining tires, 
modified them in the United States (creating derivative works), used the 
modified blueprints to manufacture tires in China, and sold the tires to 
plaintiff’s foreign customers.95 The Fourth Circuit affirmed an award of $26 
million for defendants’ profits from the sales of tires in foreign countries, 
based on the “predicate act” doctrine.96 This award was improper for two 
reasons. First, it was based on the sales of tires, rather than on the value of the 
blueprints. Under the U.S. Copyright Act, tires are “useful articles”;97 and 
while blueprints are copyrightable, “copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work, portraying a useful article as such, does not extend to the 
 
 
93 Id. at 931. 
94 340 F.3d at 931-32. 
95 682 F.3d 292, 298-99 (4th Cir. 2012). Although the appellate opinion does not expressly 
state that all of the sales took place in foreign countries, one of the lower court opinions does: 
“[t]here was no evidence that any of these customers were located inside the United States.” 
In re Outsidewall Tire Litigation, 2010 WL 11474982, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2010). 
96 682 F.3d at 308. In so holding, it cited only the Ninth Circuit’s initial opinion in LANS, and 
not the later opinion limiting the doctrine to awards of defendant’s profits. Id. at 307-08. 
Nonetheless, the award it affirmed was based on the defendant’s profits from the sales of 
tires. 
97 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function 
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”). 
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manufacture of the useful article itself.”98 “The proper award should have 
been limited to licensing fees for use of the blueprints to make the tires,” 
rather than profits from the sale of the tires.99 Second, the award was based 
solely on two “predicate acts” that occurred outside the limitations period 
(more than three years before the complaint was filed): reproduction of the 
blueprints and the preparation of modified blueprints based on them.100 If the 
rationale of the “predicate act” doctrine is that the foreign profits are an 
appropriate remedy for a completed act of domestic infringement, then the 
award should have been zero, because all of the acts of domestic infringement 
fell outside of the limitations period. Although the foreign sales took place 
within the limitations period, those sales were not independently actionable 
under U.S. law. The Fourth Circuit erroneously treated the “predicate act” 
doctrine as an excuse for extending the territorial reach of the statute, rather 
than as a remedy for a domestic infringing act. 
Scholars on both sides of the extraterritorial debate have criticised the 
“predicate act” doctrine as drawing an untenable line. Jane Ginsburg argues 
that it “does not make sense” that “everything turns on the creation of a 
 
 
98 H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 105 (1976). This statement comes from the legislative history, as 
the statute itself merely preserves preexisting case law to that effect. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) 
(“This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article 
as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the 
useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law … in effect on 
December 31, 1977.”). See also Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 
1010 (2017) (although “a cardboard model of a car … could itself be copyrightable, it would 
not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.”); id. at 1033 (Breyer, J., joined 
by Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The law has long recognized that drawings or photographs of 
real-world objects are copyrightable as drawings or photographs, but the copyright does not 
give protection against others making the underlying useful objects.”) (citing §113(b) and 
quoting the House Report). 
99 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:92.50. 
100 In re Outsidewall Tire Litigation, 748 F. Supp. 2d 543, 553-54 (E.D. Va. 2010), affirmed 
in relevant part, reversed in part and remanded sub nom. Tire Eng’g & Dist., LLC v. 
Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2012). 





material copy within U.S. borders.”101 She would allow extraterritorial 
damages to be recovered whenever any acts connected to the foreign 
infringement occurred in the United States, including mere “authorisation,” 
as in Subafilms.102 William Patry agrees that the distinction does not make 
sense; but he maintains that damages from extraterritorial infringement can 
never be recovered under U.S. law, even if there has been a “predicate act” of 
infringement in the United States.103 Instead, he argues, damages from 
extraterritorial infringement can only be recovered under foreign law.104 
The author agrees with Patry that there is nothing in the U.S. Copyright Act 
that expressly rebuts the strong presumption against extraterritoriality.105 
Indeed, the 2008 amendment to address cases of exportation (where copies 
are reproduced in the United States, exported and then sold overseas) carries 
with it the negative implication that the “predicate act” doctrine is 
overbroad.106 Nonetheless, the doctrine seems firmly entrenched in U.S. 
jurisprudence. If courts are going to use the “predicate act” doctrine, then the 
restriction by the Ninth Circuit makes sense. “Actual damages” are a legal 
 
 
101 Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multi-territoriality in Copyright Infringement, 
37 Va. J. Int’l L. 587, 598 (1997). 
102 Id. at 597-98. 
103 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:92 (“Accordingly where a work is initially infringed overseas 
[sic; should be “in the United States”] and then additional acts are committed overseas 
facilitated by the U.S. infringement, there is no liability for the overseas acts under U.S. law.”) 
(emphasis added). My bracketed correction is confirmed by the emphasized language, and 
by the title of the sub-chapter, which is “A Work is Infringed Initially in the United States 
and Then Additional Acts are Committed Overseas, Facilitated by the U.S. Infringement.” 
(Patry also confirmed the correction in an email exchange, on file with the author.) In Patry’s 
view, Update Art was overruled sub silentio by the U.S. Supreme Court, and should not be 
followed. PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:91; see also id. at §25:89 (criticizing Sheldon), §25:90 
(criticizing Update Art). 
104 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:88. This does not mean, however, that such claims can only 
be heard in foreign courts. Patry agrees that U.S. courts can hear foreign infringement claims 
if they are related to claims for infringement occurring in the U.S. PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 
§25:83. 
105 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:86, §25:91. 
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2). 
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remedy, whereas a “constructive trust” is an equitable remedy that often 
accompanies an accounting of the defendant’s profits, which is also an 
equitable remedy.107 Thus, perhaps it is reasonable to utilise a constructive 
trust in measuring the “profits of the infringer that are attributable to the 
[domestic act of] infringement.”108 
The “predicate act” doctrine gives copyright owners a great advantage in the 
digital age. Because computers must create temporary versions of digitally 
encoded works in “random access memory” (or RAM) in order to function,109 
it frequently will be the case that at least one such version will be created on 
a computer in the United States as a preliminary step toward committing 
infringement elsewhere. Such RAM versions are considered “copies” or 
“phonorecords” if they subsist “for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”110 The reproduction right grants copyright owners the exclusive 
 
 
107 See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) 
(restitution is sometimes a legal remedy, but it is an equitable remedy, “ordinarily in the form 
of a constructive trust …, where money or property identified as belonging in good 
conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the 
defendant’s possession.”); id. at 214 n.2 (“an accounting for profits [is] a form of equitable 
restitution …. If, for example, a plaintiff is entitled to a constructive trust on particular 
property held by the defendant, he may also recover profits produced by the defendant’s use 
of that property, even if he cannot identify a particular res containing the profits sought to be 
recovered.”). 
108 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
109 See Cartoon Network, L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 128 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008). 
110 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Copies’ are material objects … in which a work is fixed by any method 
now known or later developed”); id. (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression 
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord … is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”); see also MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 
518 (9th Cir. 1993); Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Assocs.., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998); cf. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127-29 (distinguishing MAI and holding that a 
stream of data embodied in RAM for no more than 1.2 seconds was only of “transitory 
duration”). 
If the work is a sound recording, then the material object in which the work is fixed is 
considered to be a “phonorecord” instead of a “copy.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Phonorecords’ are 
material objects in which sounds … are fixed by any method now known or later developed”). 





right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”111 Thus, 
copying data into RAM is an infringement of the reproduction right; and 
under the “predicate act” doctrine, if one or more “RAM” copies are made in 
the United States, profits from the subsequent reproduction and use of such 
copies overseas may be recovered under U.S. law.112 Recently, however, two 
Courts of Appeals have refused to extend U.S. law to foreign infringements 
where the only “predicate acts” alleged were downloading content from a 
computer based in the United States to a computer located in a foreign 
country, despite the possibility that temporary “RAM” copies were made in 
the United States in the course of such downloading.113 
IV. Transmissions 
Broadcast transmissions made in one country can often be received in another 
country (with or without the aid of retransmission).114 The Berne Convention 
requires countries to provide authors with “the exclusive right of authorising 
… the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public 
by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images” and “any 
 
 
111 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
112 Cf. Elsevier, Ltd. v. Chitika, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402-03 (D. Mass. 2011) (allegation 
that a citizen and resident of India uploaded infringing copies of plaintiff’s books in India 
that were downloaded in U.S. “does not constitute an act of direct infringement occurring 
entirely within the United States,” so predicate act doctrine did not apply; but declining to 
dismiss infringement claim because “factual issues involving the structure of the Internet and 
the locus of the infringing activity remain.”). 
113 See IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza, Ltd., 965 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alleged copycat 
restaurant did not violate U.S. Copyright Act because reproduction occurred entirely in the 
United Kingdom; allegation that copyrighted photographs were downloaded from servers 
located in the U.S. was not a domestic act of infringement, because “copies” were fixed on 
the receiving end); Superama Corp. v. Tokyo Broadcasting System Television, Inc., 830 Fed. 
App’x 821 (9th Cir. 2020) (complaint alleging that Japanese defendant downloaded 
recording of a U.S. sumo tournament and broadcast it in Japan was properly dismissed; 
downloading does not occur where the material is stored, but where the downloader is 
located). 
114 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“To ‘transmit’ a performance or display is to communicate it by any 
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they 
are sent.”). 
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communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of 
the work” by a different party.115 The United States, however, did not adopt 
this language; instead, it grants authors the exclusive right “to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly,”116 and it defines “publicly” to include four types 
of performances (arranged in two clauses): 
(1) to perform or display [the work] at a place open to the public 
or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; 
or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or 
display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members 
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same 
time or at different times.117 
 
For purposes of the territoriality principle, the question becomes: does the 
resulting performance occur in the country from which the transmission 
originates, or the country in which the transmission is received, or both? As 
the cases below demonstrate, with one notable exception, U.S. courts have 
applied the law of the country in which the transmission is received. 
In Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp.,118 plaintiff had 
licensed the exclusive right to broadcast certain motion pictures in Western 
Canada, while Showtime had licensed the right to broadcast many of the same 
motion pictures in the United States. Showtime transmitted its programs by 
 
 
115 Berne Convention, art. 11bis(1) & (2). 
116 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). 
117 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
118 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 1995). 





satellite to subscribers, but the “footprint” of the satellite also could be 
received in Canada. General Instrument made and sold hardware and software 
to scramble the transmission, and a decoder device to allow authorised 
subscribers to descramble the transmission. The complaint alleged that 
General sold “decoders in the U.S. and Canada in numbers far in excess of 
any authorised users and to people whom it knew or had reason to know were 
using the decoders for the purpose of receiving American [subscription] TV 
programming in Allarcom’s territory.”119 The amended complaint stated only 
state-law causes of action, and the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground 
that the action was pre-empted by Copyright Act. 
The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the U.S. Copyright Act 
applied either “if part of an act of infringement begins in the United States, 
and is completed in a foreign jurisdiction, or if a person in the United States 
authorises an infringement that takes place in a foreign jurisdiction.”120 The 
Ninth Circuit explained that in Subafilms, “[w]e held that in order for U.S. 
copyright law to apply, at least one alleged infringement must be completed 
entirely within the United States, and that mere authorisation of 
extraterritorial infringement was not a completed act of infringement in the 
United States.”121 It then summarily reversed, saying: 
In this case, defendants either initiated a potential 
infringement in the United States by broadcasting the 
Showtime signal, which contained copyrighted material, or 
defendants authorised people in Canada to engage in 
infringement. In either case, the potential infringement was 
 
 
119 Id. at 384. 
120 Id. at 387. 
121 Id. 
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only completed in Canada once the signal was received and 
viewed. Accordingly, U.S. copyright law did not apply, and 
therefore did not pre-empt Allarcom’s state law claims.122 
It should be noted, however, that Showtime was authorised to transmit the 
copyrighted material in the United States, so the transmission itself could not 
be infringing. The only possible basis for liability was contributory 
infringement in selling decoder boxes, and both the sales and the use of those 
boxes (and therefore the viewing) took place in Canada. Thus, the court was 
correct in holding that U.S. law did not apply. It is far from clear, however, 
that the court meant to preclude application of U.S. law to unauthorised 
transmissions containing copyrighted material originating in the United 
States. 
The Second Circuit reached the opposite result in National Football League 
v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, in which PrimeTime held a statutory license 
to retransmit network programming of NFL games by satellite to “subscribers 
in United States households that do not have adequate over-the-air broadcast 
reception from primary television stations, i.e., ‘unserved’ households.”123 
PrimeTime, however, also retransmitted the games to subscribers in 
Canada.124 The question was whether doing so violated any provision of U.S. 
copyright law. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court ruling that 





123 211 F.3d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2000). See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (authorizing “secondary 
transmissions to unserved households”); § 119(d)(10) (defining “unserved household”). 
124 Again, the single retransmission originated from the United States, but the signal could be 
received in Canada, so one assumes PrimeTime made the games available to Canadian 
subscribers by selling or renting satellite dishes and decoder boxes to those subscribers. 





We believe the most logical interpretation of the Copyright 
Act is to hold that a public performance or display includes 
each step in the process by which a protected work wends its 
way to its audience. Under that analysis, it is clear that 
PrimeTime’s uplink transmission of signals captured in the 
United States is a step in the process by which NFL’s protected 
work wends its way to a public audience. In short, PrimeTime 
publicly displayed or performed material in which the NFL 
owns the copyright. Because PrimeTime did not have 
authorization to make such a public performance, PrimeTime 
infringed the NFL’s copyright.125 
This holding is problematic, because PrimeTime’s retransmission ostensibly 
was authorised pursuant to a statutory license.126 The court should have 
analysed the case as one of contributory infringement: PrimeTime contributed 
to an infringement in Canada by selling or renting satellite dishes and decoder 
boxes to subscribers in Canada. If one analyses the case this way, it is clear 
that the action should have been resolved under Canadian law, not under U.S. 
law. 
This analysis becomes even clearer when we consider the converse of the 
situations in Allarcom and PrimeTime 24. In Los Angeles News Service v. 
Conus Communications Co., defendant Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(“CBC”) allegedly broadcast plaintiff’s news footage in Canada without 
 
 
125 211 F.3d at 13. 
126 Patry nonetheless approves of the holding, on the ground that a single transmission can be 
“simultaneously infringing and non-infringing,” depending on the content and the viewer. 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §25:98. While the statute and legislative history indicates that 
Congress did intend for intermediate transmissions to be treated as public performances, H.R. 
Rep. 94-1476, at 63-64 (1976), there is no indication that Congress intended to regulate such 
performances when the “public” that received them was located outside the United States. 
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authorisation.127 Its broadcast transmissions were received in border areas of 
the United States.128 The district court denied CBC’s motion to dismiss, 
holding that if the footage was broadcast without authorisation, “an act of 
infringement was committed within the United States when the Canadian 
transmission was received and viewed here.”129 Likewise, in Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, defendants in Canada received 
broadcast transmissions from the United States, “converted these television 
signals into computerised data and streamed them over the Internet from a 
website called iCraveTV.com.”130 As in Conus, the court held that “although 
the streaming of the plaintiffs’ programming originated in Canada, acts of 
infringement were committed within the United States when United States 
citizens received and viewed defendants’ streaming of the copyrighted 
materials.”131 In both cases, as in Allarcom, it was the place where the 
transmissions were received that was determinative.132 
 
 
127 969 F. Supp. 579, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
128 Id. There was evidence that in 1992–1993, “an average of 7,814 households in the United 
States received CBC’s broadcast signal and actually watched CBC.” Id. 
129 Id. at 584; see also id. at 583 (“Plaintiffs claim direct acts of infringement—not merely 
authorization—by the display of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works on American television 
sets.”). 
In holding so, the district court relied on its own prior opinion in Los Angeles News Service 
v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (C.D. Cal. 1996), which was later 
reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit based on the “predicate act” of infringement 
doctrine. 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998). If the defendants in Reuters had transmitted the works 
overseas without having made videotape copies or unauthorized transmissions in the United 
States, then presumably the Ninth Circuit would have followed Allarcom and found no 
liability. 
130 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831, 1832 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
131 Id. at 1835. 
132 One could distinguish the two cases, however, on the ground that in iCraveTV, there was 
good evidence that the defendant was “targeting” the United States; whereas in Conus, the 
CBC credibly alleged that “any allegedly infringing activity in the United States was 
unintended and unavoidable.” 969 F. Supp. at 584. Because the complaint in Conus alleged 
direct infringement, however, rather than contributory infringement, the court held that intent 
was immaterial. Id.  





The D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion in Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Telewizja Polska, S.A.133 Defendant TVP, the Polish national television 
broadcaster and the author of the 51 programs at issue, posted its own 
programs on its own website in Poland on a video-on-demand basis. TVP had 
granted Spanski, a Canadian corporation, an exclusive license to perform its 
programs in North and South America. Pursuant to an earlier settlement 
agreement between the parties, TVP was required to use “geo-blocking” to 
prevent the programs on its Polish website from being viewed by viewers in 
North and South America.134 Spanski discovered, however, that at least 51 
programs were available and could be viewed in the United States and 
Canada. Spanski sued, and the district court found that TVP employees had 
intentionally disabled the geo-blocking on those programs.135 The D.C. 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling that TVP was “performing” the videos 
by transmitting them into the United States.136 TVP protested strenuously that 
it could not be held liable under U.S. law because it had acted only in Poland. 
The court disagreed: 
Here, although it was in Poland that TV Polska uploaded and 
digitally formatted the fifty-one episodes, the infringing 
performances—and consequent violation of Spanski’s 
copyrights—occurred on the computer screens in the United 
States on which the episodes’ images were shown. 
Accordingly, because the conduct relevant to the statute’s 
focus occurred in the United States, this case involves a 
 
 
133 883 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
134 Id. at 907. 
135 Id. at 908. 
136 Id. at 910. In holding so, the court relied on American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 
573 U.S. 431, 441 (2014), which held, in the context of unauthorized Internet 
retransmissions, that “both the broadcaster and the viewer of a television program ‘perform,’ 
because they both show the program’s images and make audible the program’s sounds.” 
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permissible domestic application of the Copyright Act, even if 
other conduct occurred abroad.137 
The court also rejected TVP’s argument that the ruling would leave every 
Internet user in the world subject to liability in the United States, noting that 
many such users would not be subject to personal jurisdiction here.138 Relying 
on the finding that TVP had intentionally disabled the geo-blocking in order 
to allow its programs to be viewed in the United States, it held that “where a 
foreign broadcaster uploads copyrighted content to its website and directs that 
content onto a computer screen in the United States at a user’s request, the 
broadcaster commits an actionable domestic violation of the Copyright 
Act.”139 Other courts have agreed.140 
Applying the law of the country in which the broadcast or transmission is 
received has one serious drawback: it subjects the broadcaster or transmitting 
party to the law of multiple jurisdictions. That means the broadcaster or 
transmitting party must employ scrambling or geo-blocking or take other 
reasonable efforts to prevent content that may lawfully be performed in one 
jurisdiction from being received in a jurisdiction where such performance is 
 
 
137 Spanski, 883 F.3d at 914 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
138 Id. at 915-16. 
139 Id. at 918; see also id. at 916 (“we need hold only that a foreign broadcaster that, as here, 
directs infringing performances into the United States from abroad commits a domestic 
violation of the Copyright Act.) (emphasis added). 
140 See, e.g., Crunchyroll, Inc. v. Pledge, 2014 WL 1347492, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) 
(defendant that uploaded copyrighted works to YouTube from the United Kingdom, which 
“were then made available for viewing around the world, including in the United States,” 
was liable because conduct was not “wholly extraterritorial”); Shropshire v. Canning, 809 F. 
Supp. 2d 1139, 1145-46 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (although defendant created allegedly infringing 
video entirely in Canada, he “allegedly uploaded it to YouTube’s California servers for 
display in the United States,” which led “to the subsequent viewing of the video by potentially 
thousands in the United States.”); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller Features 
Syndicate, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 198, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting Canadian licensee’s 
extraterritoriality defense because allegedly infringing material was accessible from 
computers within the United States). 
 





unlawful. But the alternative is a “least common denominator” world in which 
the country from which the content is uploaded can impose its standards on 
other countries where the transmission can be received, even if the content 
has not been licensed in those other countries. An acceptable intermediate 
position is to apply the law of the country where the broadcast or transmission 
is received so long as the transmitting party has “targeted” that country in 
some meaningful way (for example, by seeking or accepting subscribers in 
that country), so that it is on notice that it will be subject to the laws of that 
country. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the nominal rule that U.S. copyright law is not “extraterritorial,” 
courts in the United States have applied U.S. copyright law to a wide range 
of multi-territorial infringement claims. Both importation and exportation of 
infringing copies or phonorecords of works are prohibited by statute, and the 
distribution right has been interpreted broadly to apply to a foreign seller who 
ships infringing goods into the United States. Acts in another country that 
contribute to infringement in the United States have been held actionable 
under U.S. law. Although mere “authorisation” in the United States that 
contributes to infringement occurring entirely in another country is not 
actionable, if there is a “predicate act” of infringement in the United States, 
courts are willing to award the defendant’s profits resulting from that 
infringement, even if those profits were earned overseas.  And although courts 
are split over whether transmissions originating in the United States must be 
received here to be actionable, courts agree that transmissions originating 
outside the United States that are received here are actionable under U.S. law, 
at least where the defendant intentionally “targeted” those transmissions at 
the United States in some way. Taken together, these doctrines afford 
copyright owners a wide range of options for applying U.S. copyright law to 
multi-territorial infringement claims. 
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The United States has a strong interest in regulating conduct that results in a 
direct infringement within the territory of the United States. Such claims, 
however, should be analysed as claims of contributory infringement, a 
doctrine which requires knowledge of the infringing conduct, so that a foreign 
party is not subject to liability without knowledge that its conduct will be 
judged under U.S. law. Conversely, conduct within the United States that 
results in a direct infringement in a foreign country ought to be judged by the 
standards of the foreign country’s laws, at least in cases like Subafilms, where 
the domestic actor has knowledge that its actions will lead to foreign 
distribution. A proper respect for international comity, therefore, suggests that 
the United States should eliminate, or drastically limit, the “predicate act” 
doctrine. Doing so would not necessarily eliminate the possibility of having 
the case resolved in a single forum, but it would help ensure that the interests 
of other countries are taken into account when U.S. courts adjudicate multi-
territorial infringement claims. 
